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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Saul Lucas conditionally pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance
specifically preserving his right to challenge the district court's order denying his motion
to suppress. Mr. Lucas asserts that he was unlawfully seized by police officers and that
his subsequent purported consent to search and incriminating statements were unlawful
products of his initial unlawful detention.

Therefore, the district court erred when it

denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a complaint alleging that Saul Lucas possessed a small amount of
methamphetamine found in a pipe he had in his pocket. (R., pp.2-8.) Mr. Lucas waived
his right to a preliminary hearing, was bound over into the district court, and an
Information was filed charming him with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.2530.)

Mr. Lucas filed a motion to suppress all "evidence gathered by law enforcement
as a result of an unlawful detention and search of the Defendant[.]" (R., pp.39-40.)
Mr. Lucas based his motion
upon the facts that while the Defendant was sleeping in his vehicle, at
residence on private property, City of Gooding Police Officer Theresa
Thiemann opened the Defendant's vehicle door and ordered the
Defendant out of vehicle. Defendant was then handcuffed and searched
by the City of Gooding Police Officer Newland. Officer Newland asked
questions of the Defendant without informing of his Miranda rights. The
search of the Defendant was conducted without probable cause or without
having a warrant. Because of the unlawful detention and search of the
Defendant all evidence seized and all statements made by the Defendant
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should be suppressed.

(R,

39.)
During the hearing on Mr. Lucas' motion to suppress, Officer Thiemann testified

that on the day in question she was investigating a possible theft from Mr. Lucas' place
of employment.

(Tr., p.6, L1 - p.7, L1.)

She tracked some of the items to a local

recycling center, and Mr. Lucas was identified by a copy of his photo ID as the person
who brought those items to the recycling center. (Tr., p.7, Ls.2-13.) Officer Thiemann
and two other officers went to Mr. Lucas' apartment. (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-24; see also Exh
A.) 1 Officer Thiemann testified that she noticed Mr. Lucas was sleeping in the driver's
seat of his truck parked in the parking lot - her video recording showed that she
knocked on his window, and then immediately opened his driver's side door and asked
him what he was doing. (Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.8, L3; see also Exh. A.)
The district court described the contents of what transpired as follows:
Officer Thiemann: (Knocks on driver's side door) Hey Saul, what are you
doing?
Lucas: Sleeping.
Officer Thiemann: Obviously. Do you know what time it is?
Lucas: Yes.
Officer Thiemann: What time is it?

Lucas: um, 8.
Officer Thiemann: You supposed to be somewhere?
Lucas: Up there. (Indicating his apartment)
The Defense provided the district court with a copy of the video and audio of the
entirety of the encounter taken by Officer Thiemann's body-cam. (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-23.)
1

2

Officer Thiemann: Up there? But you didn't go up there? Alright well step
and talk to me

a minute would you please?

Lucas: Sure (With additional indistinct response; stepping out defendant
drops his car keys)
Officer Thiemann: Ope, hands out of your pockets if you don't mind. Saul,
hands out of your pockets. Thank you, man. Here, give me your keys.
You don't have any weapons on you right?
Lucas: No ma'am.
Officer Thiemann: Mind if he checks real quick?
Officer Newland: Place your hands behind your back. (Defendant moves
to truck bed and Officer Newland places cuffs on him). Y'all have anything
in your pockets at all? Saul?
Lucas: Yah, I do.
Officer Newland: What do you have?
Lucas: (Indistinct) pipe.
Officer Newland: Huh?
Lucas: (Indistinct) pipe.
Officer Newland: What is it? Huh? Am I going to get poked, sticked [sic],
stabbed or bitten by it?
Lucas: (Indistinct)
Officer Newland: What is it then?
Lucas: A pipe.
Officer Newland: What kind of pipe? A little closer to the vehicle please.
Go ahead and spread your feet for me. You going to tell me what kind of
pipe?
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Officer Thiemann: (Talking to dispatch)
Officer Newland: Saul? Be straight man
Lucas: (Indistinct)
Officer Newland:

Meth? K. Anything else other than meth? (Begins

search and takes pipe from his person). Anything else on you?
(R., p.51; see also Exh. A.) The video shows that after Mr. Lucas picked up his own
keys, Officer Thiemann told him to give her his keys, he did so, and she put them on his
truck bed. (Exh. A.) Officer Thiemann testified that, upon her asking Mr. Lucas if he
minded if Officer Newland checked him for weapons, Mr. Lucas and Officer Newland
walked towards each other. (Tr., p.13, L.7 - p.14, L.1.) Officer Newland immediately
told Mr. Lucas to place his hands behind his back. (Exh A.) Officer Newland testified
that after Mr. Lucas admitted that he had a meth pipe in his pocked, he put gloves on
and removed the pipe. (Tr., p.20, L.14

p.23, L.10.)

The prosecutor did not attempt to argue that Mr. Lucas was lawfully detained by
the officers based upon a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in the alleged theft
occurring at his place of employment; rather, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Lucas
consented to the encounter when he agreed to get out of his truck and speak with the
officers.

(Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.8.)

The prosecutor also argued that Mr. Lucas

consented to the search of his pockets.

(Tr., p.32, Ls.17-23.)

The prosecutor

continued, "[t]he issue here, I think, is really whether he needed to be Mirandized or not
and whether the statement's admissible," and the prosecutor argued that even if the
court were to suppress Mr. Lucas' statement that it was a meth pipe, the pipe itself
should not be suppressed. (Tr., p.33, Ls.4-17.)
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Counsel for Mr. Lucas argued, "[t]here wasn't any voluntary actions by the
defendant ... there's three armed officers

- standing there. He is awakened and

the proceeded to get out The Court sees his grogginess.

He's basically told, 'Step

over here. I'm going to search you for weapons."' (Tr., p.33, L.19 - p.34, L.2.) Counsel
continued, "[t]he State has the burden to show that it was consensual. There was no
stepping towards it. When she tells him that officer is doing it, that officer's coming.

I

don't thing - the acquiescence of being told is not giving voluntary consent for the
warrant requirement. That State has the burden to prove it was a voluntary consent."
(Tr., p. 34, Ls. 12-18.)
The district court took the matter under advisement and ultimately issued a
written decision.

(R., pp.47-60.)

The district court held that Mr. Lucas voluntarily

consented to the search of his person based upon the totality of the circumstances;
however, the court found that his admission that he had a meth pipe, though not the
pipe itself, would be suppressed as he made that statement while in custody for
Miranda purposes and he was not informed of his Miranda rights. Id.

The district court did not specifically determine whether Mr. Lucas was seized
from the beginning of the encounter, as argued by defense counsel ("[t]here wasn't any
voluntary actions by the defendant"), or whether he voluntarily got out of his truck and
the initial encounter was consensual, as argued by the prosecutor. Id.

However, the

court implicitly found that the initial encounter was consensual as the court made the
factual finding that "at the point officers asked him to submit to the search a reasonable
person would have believed that he was free to leave by asking to have his keys back
and directing officers to get a warrant." (R., p.53.)
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Mr. Lucas pied guilty to possession of methamphetamine specifically preserving
right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress on appeal; in
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a separate misdemeanor count and to
recommend a suspended unified term of two years, with one year fixed, and for
Mr. Lucas to be placed on probation. 2 (R., pp.61-62; Tr., p.42, L.7 - p.55, L.8.) The
district court sentenced Mr. Lucas to a unified term of two years, with one year fixed,
and placed him on probation for a period of two years, and Mr. Lucas filed a timely
Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.69-83, 94-97; Tr., p.62, Ls.6-16.)

In "vehemently" arguing for Mr. Lucas to be placed on probation, the prosecutor stated
that while he believed the district court correctly ruled on the motion to suppress, he did
not believe the conduct of the officers involved should be rewarded by the district court
retaining jurisdiction, as recommended by the author of the PSI. (Tr., p.59, L.22 - p.60,

2

L.16.)
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ISSUE
court err

it denied Mr. Lucas's
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to suppress?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lucas's Motion To Suppress

A

Introduction
Mr. Lucas asserts that the district court erred in its implied conclusion that his

purported consent to search was not a product of his unlawful seizure occurring when
Officer Thiemann first opened his truck door and ordered him to get out and talk to her.
Mr. Lucas asserts that the State failed to demonstrate that Mr. Lucas' encounter with
the officers was consensual; as such, the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Lucas's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the

right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Its
purpose is "to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to 'safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312
(1978)). A warrantless seizure of a person is per se unreasonable unless justified by a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See generally Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).

The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3

8

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho
559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). If evidence is not seized either pursuant to a valid warrant or
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered
as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

The State did not seek to justify Mr. Lucas' seizure through an exception to the
warrant requirement; rather, the State argued that no seizure took place at all because
the encounter was consensual. (Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.8.) Not all contacts between
police and citizens result in a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; rather, only when
an officer, by means of physical force or

of authority, "has in some way restrained

the liberty of a citizen .. a 'seizure'
(1968). "[l]n order to determine

" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19. fn 16

particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a

court must consider all

surround

the encounter to determine

whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S

439 (1991)

Mr. Lucas asserts that he was seized when Officer Thiemann woke him up by
knocking on his window, opened his truck door, and told him to get of the his truck and
speak with him as, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in his
position would not feel free to decline the officers request and to otherwise end the
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encounter. It is undisputed that he was lawfully sleeping in his lawfully parked truck
Officer Thiemann knocked on his window and opened his door. With two other
uniformed police officers standing nearby, Officer Thiemann stood within a couple of
feet of Mr. Lucas, likely preventing him from being able to close his door without her
having to move, and she started asking him questions. (See Exh. A) Officer Thiemann
asked him "what are you doing?" and Mr. Lucas stated that he was "[s]leeping."
(R., p.51; see a/so Exh. A.) Officer Thiemann then asked him if he knew what time it
was and if he was "supposed to be somewhere?" (R., p.51; see a/so Exh. A) After
Mr. Lucas responded that he was supposed to be "up there" referring to his apartment,
Officer Thiemann stated, [u]p there? But you didn't go up there?" (R., p.51; see a/so
Exh. A) She then told him, "[a]lright well step out here and talk to me for a minute
would you please?" (R., p.51; see a/so Exh. A)
A reasonable person awoken by an officer who, without his permission, opened

his truck door and stood a couple of feet away and had two armed officers nearby, and
then asked questions about what they were doing, what time it was, and whether they
are supposed to be somewhere, would not feel free to ignore the officer's order to "step
out here and talk to me for a minute," no matter how nicely they were asked. The fact
that officer Theimann said "would you please" at the end of her statement "step out here
and talk to me for a minute," does not transfer her command into a request a
reasonable person would feel free to ignore.

Officer Thiemann's statement was

"inherently coercive" and a reasonable person in Mr. Lucas' position would not feel free
to ignore her and either shut the door or get out of the truck and walk away. See e.g.
State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding an officer's statement to
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the defendant that '"he needed to come speak to [the deputy'" was "inherently coercive"
, Mr. Lucas was '·seized" within the

the circumstances of that case.")
meaning of the Fourth Amendment

The State did not attempt to justify Mr. Lucas' seizure based upon any exception
to the warrant requirement

Though the prosecutor submitted, and the evidence

supported, that the officers contacted Mr. Lucas because they were investigating the
crime of theft, the prosecutor did not argue that the fruits of the investigation at that
point would justify Mr. Lucas' seizure. Instead, the prosecutor specifically argued that
Officer Thiemann asked Mr. Lucas to get out of the car - 'That's not an order. That's a
request. He could have refused to comply if he wanted to at that time." (Tr., p.31, L.22
- p.32, L.8.) However, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates conclusively that
a reasonable person in Mr. Lucas' position would view Officer Thiemann's statement,
"step out here and talk to me for a minute would you please," as an order, not a request.
Because the State did not have a warrant and did not attempt to justify this seizure
through an exception to the warrant requirement, the seizure violated Mr. Lucas' Fourth
Amendment rights, and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lucas respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 19th day of November, 2015.

uty State Appellate Public Defender
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